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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JEANNETTE MARIE DRONEBURG, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 880539-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, methamphetamine, a third degree felony, 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, marijuana, a class B 
misdemeanor, each in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1986) (Supp. 1988), and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1986). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1987) (Supp. 1988), 
because the appeal is from a district court criminal conviction 
involving a felony of less than first degree or capital. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on the 
following provisions: 
1. United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment; 
2. Utah State Constitution, Article I, S 14; 
3. Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1986)(Supp. 
1988); 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1986); 
5. Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30 (1982); 
6. Rule 11(e), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals; 
7. Rule 24, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether exigent circumstances existed at the time 
of the search which would otherwise justify an immediate 
reasonable search of the vehicle even if the warrant obtained was 
invalid. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
suggesting to the jury not to open "packets" of potentially 
dangerous controlled substances, when to do so would not further 
any legitimate purpose; and whether defendant followed proper 
procedure to preserve that issue for appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jeannette Marie Droneburg, was charged with 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony, Possession of a Controlled Substance, marijuana, a 
class B misdemeanor, each in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1986) (Supp. 1988), and Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 58-37a-5 (1986). 
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence 
obtained by the search of her property, claiming that the search 
warrant issued by the Honorable John W. Yardley was based on an 
insufficient affidavit. On January 7, 1988, the hearing on the 
motion was held in the Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for 
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Garfield County, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, presiding. The 
court denied the motion. 
Defendant was convicted of two counts of Possession of 
a Controlled Substance a •? * count of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia on April 22, 1988, following a jury trial, in the 
Sixth Judicial District Court, in and for Garfield County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge, presiding. Defendant 
was sentenced by Judge Tibbs to a term of zero to five years at 
the Utah State Penitentiary and a fine in the sum of $5,000 for 
the felony conviction, and six months in the Garfield County Jail 
and a fine in the sum of $1,000 for each misdemeanor conviction. 
The above sentences and fines were suspended and defendant was 
placed on probation for a term of eighteen months. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 24, 1987, the Sheriff of Garfield County, 
Robert Vaughn Judd, obtained information from a confidential 
informant relating to the possible arrival of the controlled 
substance methamphetamine at a residence In Panguitch (Transcript 
of Suppression hearing [hereinafter S.] at 4, 5, 16) Sheriff 
Judd had received reliable information from the informant in the 
past, and he believed t! ie present information to be similarly 
reliable (S. at 17) . 
Upon receiving the information, Sheriff Judd conducted 
his own investigation (S. at 5). Oi :;i Apr i 1 24th ai id 25th, Sheriff 
Judd, acting on the information, conducted a surveillance on a 
private residence at 260 North 100 West in Panguitch, ii i order to 
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see if there were any vehicles with California license plates (S. 
at 6). He observed none (S. at 6). 
On April 28th, Sheriff Judd again received information 
from the confidential informant indicating that the individual 
bringing the controlled substance (methamphetamine) into 
Panguitch had left California and was due to arrive in Panguitch 
between 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. that afternoon (S. at 6, 
Transcript of trial [hereinafter T.] at 61). On the basis of 
that information, Sheriff Judd prepared an affidavit in 
furtherance of obtaining a search warrant and presented it to 
Judge Yardley, a Justice of the Peace (A copy of the search 
warrant and affidavit are attached in the Addendum). Judge 
Yardley, finding sufficient probable cause, issued the search 
warrant (S. at 7). 
After obtaining the search warrant, Sheriff Judd, 
accompanied by Deputy Sheriff John Niemann, set up a surveillance 
near 260 North 100 West, Panguitch, the residence of Marilyn 
Messer (S. at 7, 8, T. at 61, 62). At approximately 3:00 p.m., 
Sheriff Judd observed a small blue pickup with a white camper 
shell and California license plates pull into the driveway at 260 
North 100 West. Shortly thereafter, Sheriff Judd pulled his car 
in behind the truck (S. at 8, T. at 62). The end gate of the 
truck was down and the door of the camper shell was up, with the 
contents in the back fully visible (S. at 9, T. at 64). 
The facts are unclear whether Sheriff Judd was looking for a 
California licensed vehicle or just an out-of-state vehicle (S. 
at 6, 14, 15, T. at 75). 
Sheriff Judd observed a woman, later identified as 
defendant Jeannette Droneburg, and a child knocking on the back 
door of the residence (T. at 63, S. at 9). Finding no one home 
the two returned to the truck (T. at 61). Sheriff Judd'then 
questioned defendant "concerning time tables from information" to 
determine if the vehicle and occupants were the correct subjects 
of his investigation. Sheriff Judd asked defendant concerning 
where she had spent the night, how long she had been traveling, 
if she had stopped in Las Vegas and how long she was there (T. at 
63, 64, S. at 14). Defendant's responses corresponded 
sufficiently with the information which he had previously 
received (S. at 14). Thereafter, the warrant was executed (S. at 
10). Meanwhile, Marilyn Messer had returned home and joined the 
discussion (T. at 64). 
Upon serving the warrant, Sheriff Judd proceeded to 
search the truck. A briefcase located in the rear of the truck 
was found to contain the controlled substance methamphetamine as 
well as drug paraphernalia (including pipes, razor blades, straws 
and a roach clip), and an 8 x 10 tram*, containing several photos 
of defendant and her child (T. at 65-70, 91, 129-134, S, at 11-
13). Also found in the rear of the truck was a "bag" containing 
a "nail gloss box" and two other boxes containing <i white 
powdery substance" later identified as "low control drugs" (T. at 
68, 12 9). 
While conducting the search Sheriff Judd conti nued to 
question defendant, during which time she revealed that she had a 
quantity ot ili agB tunn In h«r puree ('this is my personal stash", 
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T. at 165) and burnt "roaches" in the truck ashtray (S. at 12, T. 
at 159/ 165). The purse contained 3.0 grams of crushed 
marijuana, a baggy with traces of methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia (S. at 12, T. at 159, 164). A pipe, forceps and 
"roach" were later found in or near the truck ashtray during a 
police inventory of the truck (T. at 74, 161). 
Defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance and one count of Possession 
of Drug Paraphernalia. 
On January 7, 1988 a hearing was held on a motion by 
defendant to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. 
Defendant alleged that the affidavit submitted by Sheriff Judd in 
support of the search warrant was insufficient to show probable 
cause. The Court denied defendant's motion. 
On April 22, 1988, defendant was tried by a jury for 
the charges. At trial, she testified that the briefcase belonged 
to a friend (T. at 157). She admitted that the purse was hers 
and that she had handed it to Sheriff Judd when he asked if she 
had anything (T. at 159). She said that she knew that the 
plastic baggy containing marijuana and the cigarette papers were 
in the purse but denied knowledge of the small vial which had 
methamphetamine residue in it which had also been found in the 
purse (T. at 159, 127). She testified that a razor blade and a 
straw and plastic baggy with methamphetamine residue, which were 
in her purse, were items that she had picked up off of the floor 
of the dwelling which she had vacated in California (T. at 155, 
160, 166-67). She admitted that she knew that these items had 
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methamphetamine present. When asked if she knew that she had 
"amphetamines" with her, she answered: 
A. No. I didn't- Well, no. I didn't, 
really, because I had forgotten about having .. 
that. 
[INDICATED] 
But there was really nothing there. 
It's just an empty bag and a straw and a 
razor blade. But I didn't want one of the 
kids to pick it up. 
(T. at 161). Defendant had handed the baggy with residue to 
Sheriff Judd when she was asked at the time of the search if she 
had any drugs (T. at 166). 
After hearing all of the evidence, the jury found 
defendant guilty of two counts of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
While the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
obtained by Sheriff Judd is probably insufficient to establish 
probable cause, the evidence produced at the suppression hearing 
and at trial justified a warrantless search of defendant's truck. 
Sheriff Judd had sufficient evidence from his confidential 
informant which, supported by his observations that corroborated 
the information he had received, gave him probable cause "to 
search the truck without a warrant. The mobility of the truck, 
along with exigent circumstances that defendant would probably 
not remain in the area, allowed a warrantless search in this 
instance. Because the search was proper under an exception to 
the warrant requirement, the evidence was properly admitted at 
trial. 
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Defendant's contention that the trial court erred by 
advising the jury not to open and inspect the packets which 
contained the controlled substances which had been introduced 
into evidence is without merit. The testimony presented at trial 
established that the methamphetamine found was only a residue and 
it was not necessary for the jury to open the packets to see how 
little was present. Defendant's claim that the jury had to open 
the packets in order to decide that defendant could not have 
known that she was carrying the controlled substances is equally 
meritless. Defendant admitted in her testimony that she knew she 
was carrying the marijuana. She also admitted picking up the 
baggy with methamphetamine residue and the paraphernalia for 
ingesting and preparing for ingestion of controlled substances 
from the floor of a home which she was vacating in California. 
Her claim that she had forgotten that the items were in her purse 
does not negate her possession of the items with knowledge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
EVEN IF THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO MAKE A 
FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE MAGISTRATE, 
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE WERE VALID UNDER THE 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT. 
Defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence 
seized pursuant to a search warrant and presented at trial by the 
prosecution, contending that the affidavit in support of the 
warrant lacked sufficient particularity to establish probable 
cause. The State concedes that the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant in this case is very minimal and probably falls 
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into the category of "bare bones" affidavits which have been 
condemned by the courts of this State and by the United States 
Supreme Court. However, respondent maintains that even if the 
affidavit and warrant are thrown out, the search of defendant's 
property was still appropriate as a warrantless search. Because 
the search was valid without the warrant, the evidence seized was 
properly admitted at trial against defendant. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures. In order for a search and 
seizure to be reasonable and constitutionally permissible, the 
general rule is that a search warrant must be issued by a neutral 
magistrate based upon probable cause. Nonetheless, as indicated 
by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 
1985): 
There are, however, several exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. These include a limited 
search incident to a lawful arrest; search of 
an automobile based on probable cause that it 
contains contraband; and seizure of evidence 
in plain view by one with a lawful right to 
be in a position to so observe it. 
Id. at 267 (emphasis added), citing Chimel v. California, 395 
U.S. 752 (1969); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); and 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); see also State v. 
Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). 
One of the most widely recognized exceptions to the 
warrant requirement and referred to by the Court in Hygh is 
commonly referred to as the "automobile exception". Generally 
stated, because of an automobile's mobility, and the fact that 
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evidence within can be quickly removed from the jurisdiction, the 
police may search the vehicle without first obtaining a search 
warrant if they have probable cause to believe that it contains 
evidence of criminal activity. See State v. Farnsworthy 519 P.2d 
244 (Utah 1974) . 
The automobile exception doctrine was first articulated 
in Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), in which the 
United States Supreme Court upheld as reasonable a warrantless 
search of an automobile stopped by police officers who had 
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband. The 
Court stated, "contraband goods concealed and illegally 
transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for 
without a warrant, . . . " Td. at 153. The scope of the Carrol 
decision has been expanded to include the warrantless search of 
an automobile that had been taken to a police station (or 
2 
otherwise securely "immobilized"), and also the warrantless 
3 
search of any container found in the automobile. One possible 
See Cambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Florida v. Meyers, 
466 U.S. 380 (1983)(per curiam). In Meyers, the Court held that 
a warrantless search may be conducted even after the vehicle has 
been immobilized as long as there was probable cause to believe 
that the vehicle contains contraband, evidence, or fruits of 
criminal activity. 
3
 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823, 824 (1982). In 
Ross, the Court explained: 
The scope of the warrantless search based 
on probable cause is no narrower—and no 
broader—than the scope of a search 
authorized by warrant supported by probable 
cause. Only the prior approval of the 
magistrate is waived; the search otherwise is 
as the magistrate could authorize. . . . The 
scope of the warrantless search of an 
automobile thus is not defined by the nature 
of the container in which the contraband is 
reason the Court has allowed the expansion of the doctrine may be 
the Court's belief that an individual has a lesser expectation of 
privacy in an automobile than he has in other places such as his 
home or office. See, i.e., California v. Carny, 471 U.S.-386 
(1985); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Christensen, 676 
P.2d 408 (Utah 1984), held that for the "[automobile] exception 
to apply, the police must have probable cause to believe that the 
automobile contains either contraband or evidence of a crime and 
that they may be lost if not immediately seized." .Id. at 411; See 
also State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986). In such a 
situation, exigent circumstances arise which justify an immediate 
reasonable warrantless search. Id. See also State v. Hygh, 711 
P.2d. 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 
1085 (Utah 1986) indicated: 
The validity of the probable cause 
determination is made from the objective 
standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable, 
cautious police officer . . . guided by his 
experience and training.' United States v. 
Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C.Cir. 1972). 
The determination of whether probable 
cause exists . . • depends upon an 
examination of all the information available 
Cont. secreted. Rather it is defined by 
the object of the search and the places in 
which there is probable cause to believe that 
it may be found. 
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to the searching officer in light of the 
circumstances as they existed at the time 
the search was made. 
Id. at 1088 (emphasis added); see also State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 
119 (Utah 1983). 
Reviewing "all the information available to the 
searching officer in light of the circumstances as they existed 
at the time of the search" in the present case (excluding the 
actual issuance of a search warrant), the evidence presented at 
the suppression hearing and the trial supports the validity of a 
warrantless search. The evidence shows that at the time of the 
search there existed ample information available to the officer 
to support his belief that there was probable cause to justify an 
immediate reasonable warrantless search of the automobile. 
The searching officer, Robert Vaughn Judd, Sheriff of 
Garfield County, on April 24, 1987, obtained information from a 
confidential informant relating to the possible arrival of the 
controlled substance methamphetamine at a specific residence in 
Panguitch (S. at 4, 5, 16). Sheriff Judd had received 
information from the informant in the past which had been 
reliable, and he believed the present information to be similarly 
reliable (S. at 17). His subsequent observations of defendant's 
arrival, and the answers she gave to his questions, verified the 
accuracy of the information which he had received. 
Upon receiving the information, Sheriff Judd conducted 
his own investigation (S. at 5). On April 24th and 25th, Sheriff 
Judd, acting on the information, established surveillance on a 
private residence at 260 North 100 West in Panguitch, in order to 
see if there were any vehicle which matched the information given 
him (S. at 6). He observed none (S. at 6). 
On April 28th, Sheriff Judd again received additional 
information from the confidential informant who indicated that 
the individual bringing the controlled substance into Panguitch 
had left California and was due to arrive in Panguitch between 
2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. that afternoon (S. at 6, T. at 61). 
Knowing this information, Sheriff Judd again set up 
surveillance near 260 North 100 West (S. at 7, 8, T. at 61, 62). 
At approximately 3:00 p.m., Sheriff Judd observed a small blue 
pickup with a white camper shell and California license plates 
pull into the driveway at 260 North 100 West. Shortly thereafter 
Sheriff Judd pulled his car in behind the truck (S. at 8, T. at 
62). 
Sheriff Judd observed a woman, later identified as 
defendant Jeannette Droneburg, and a child knocking on the back 
door of the residence (T. at 63, S. at 9). Finding no one home, 
the two returned to the truck (T. at 61). Sheriff Judd then 
questioned defendant "concerning time tables from information" to 
determine if the vehicle and occupants were the correct objects 
of his investigation. Sheriff Judd questioned defendant 
concerning where she had spent the night, how long she had been 
traveling, if she had stopped in Las Vegas and how long she was 
there (T. at 64, S. at 14). Defendant's responses corresponded 
sufficiently with the information which he had previously 
received to establish the reliability of the information which he 
had received from the confidential informant. Sheriff Judd, 
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knowing the above information, and believing that defendant was 
the correct object of his investigation, now had probable cause 
to believe that there was a controlled substance inside the 
truck. He was then justified in immediately searching the 
automobile for the suspected controlled substance. 
In this situation, exigent circumstances justifying the 
search existed for a number of reasons; (1) defendant was not 
from Panguitch or a resident of the State of Utah; (2) there was 
no indication that defendant had any direct or substantial ties 
to the State of Utah, which would warrant a belief that she would 
remain within the jurisdiction; (3) the suspected evidence was 
contained within a "mobile" vehicle not registered in the State 
of Utah, but registered in and arriving from California; and (4) 
defendant knew illegal substances were within the truck, and 
after being questioned by Sheriff Judd, she was then aware that 
he suspected that also. Under these circumstances, a warrantless 
search due to exigent circumstances was clearly justified. There 
existed a reasonable belief that, absent immediate seizure, the 
contraband would be disposed of. The Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405, 503 P.2d 848 (1972), indicated that 
when exigent circumstances exist, "the judgment of a police 
officer as to probable cause will serve as sufficient 
authorization for a search" without a warrant. ][d. at 849; citing 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
Sheriff Judd at the time of the search had sufficient 
probable cause to believe that illegally possessed controlled 
substances were present within the truck and was faced with 
exigent circumstances due to the mobility of the truck and the 
slim possibility that defendant would choose to stay in the 
jurisdiction. Therefore, an immediate reasonable search without 
a warrant was justified and the evidence was properly admitted by 
the trial court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S SUGGESTION TO THE JURY NOT 
TO OPEN SEALED "PACKETS" CONTAINING 
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, 
WAS PROPER. 
Defendant in her final argument on appeal contends that 
the trial court erred by suggesting to the jury that they not 
open packets containing potentially dangerous controlled 
substances which had been admitted into evidence. Such a 
contention is without merit. 
Defendant has failed to conform with procedure to 
preserve this question for review on appeal. As defendant 
concedes: 
Unfortunately, the arguments of counsel to 
the jury in this matter are not part of the 
record. The writer of this Brief, as trial 
counsel, respectfully represents to this 
Court that he argued to the jury that the 
quantity of methamphetamine possessed by the 
Defendant was such a small amount that no 
person could be held liable for knowingly and 
intentionally possessing it. 
Brief of Appellant at 7. 
Regardless of whether counsel's assertion is true, such 
an assertion is not proper or acceptable for consideration on 
appeal. Rule 11(e) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
unquestionably provides that it is the sole responsibility of 
defendant-appellant to "request from the reporter a transcript of 
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such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary." Defendant gives no explanation as to 
why this material was not made available, therefore we must 
presume that defendant believed it was unnecessary. 
Inasmuch as this part of the record was not requested, 
Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals requiring "all 
statements of fact and references to the proceeding below shall 
by supported by citations to the record" cannot be complied with, 
and this Court must assume the correctness of the judgment 
4 
below. See State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982); See 
also Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612 (Utah 1987); Fackrell v. 
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987). 
Even absent defendant's procedural defect, the action 
by the trial court was nonetheless entirely proper. As indicated 
above, defendant's intent was to persuade the jury that the 
amount of methamphetamine was so small that no person could be 
considered as "knowingly and intentionally possessing it". 
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1986) (Supp. 1988) 
states: 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and 
intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or 
order or directly from a practitioner while 
acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this subsection; 
The State recognizes that closing arguments are not considered 
evidence; nonetheless, the rule requires that any reference to 
the proceeding below be supported by citation to the record. 
The State was not required to show that defendant possessed any 
minimum quantity of methamphetamine in order to be in violation 
of the statute. The Utah Supreme Court indicated in State v. 
Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872 (1964), that the Amount of 
narcotic found does not have to be of any certain quantity to 
convict for unlawful possession for "[t]he determinative test is 
possession of a narcotic drug, and not usability of a narcotic 
drug." Id. at 875. 
In addition, there was no need for the jury to actually 
see the controlled substance because the amount had already been 
clearly established during cross examination of the State's 
expert witness, David Murdock: 
Q. Now when you say it's not enough to 
weigh, you have extremely sensitive scales in 
the State Crime Lab; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you can weigh items down to one 
milligram? 
A. Down to a thousandth of a milligram, 
yes. We don't consider anything more than a 
gram. If it's less than a milligram, which 
is a thousandth of a gram, we simply call it 
a residue. 
Q. Okay, Let's play some math here. Have 
we got a marker? 
CLERK: Got a red one. 
[INDICATED] 
MR. SHUMATE: Mr. Murdock, let me step 
over here to the board for purposes of 
illustration. 
THE COURT: Sorry. No problem. But I 
want the record to show it. 
MR. SHUMATE: Mr. Murdock, let's start out 
with weights that we're used to before we 
flip over into the metric. An ounce, there's 
16 of them in a pound; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
[COUNSEL INDICATED ON EXHIBIT BOARD WITH 
MARKER] 
WITNESS: I can't see that, sir. 
MR. SHUMATE: Let me get it over where we 
can see it a little clearer. Have we got a 
magic marker? 
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THE COURT: Counsel, here is the red one. 
MR. SHUMATE: We'll try black, the basic 
color. 
[CLERK RESPONDED] 
MR. SHUMATE: Q. Okay. We've got one 
pound equals 16 ounces. One ounce—that' s 
our measurement—equals how many grams? 
A. 28.3 grams. 
Q. 28.3 grams. And one gram equals a 
thousand milligrams; is that right? 
[MR. SHUMATE INDICATED ON BOARD] 
A. That's correct. 
Q. What's the abbreviation for milligram? 
MG? 
A. MG. 
[COUNSEL INDICATED ON EXHIBIT BOARD] 
Q. So if I am correct in what I think 
you're telling us, the substance that you 
identified in 3-B and 3-C, you determined was 
in weight probably less than 1 milligram; is 
that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
(T. at 134-35). With the quantity clearly established, the trial 
court was justified in not exposing the jury to any unnecessary 
problems by having them physically examine the substance. 
Finally, even if the jury for some unknown reason 
should have physically examined the methamphetamine to determine 
the quantity, the trial court's suggestion was no more than 
harmless error. Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30 (1982) states M[a]ny 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." An error is 
prejudicial only if, barring the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. See 
State v. Verde, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988). Since the quantity of 
methamphetamine had already been clearly established and the 
State was not required to show any specific amount, the 
suggestion not to open the packets of controlled substance could 
constitute no more than harmless error. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based MI IIM f i HI? '..ni, respondent respe~tf . 
requests that this Cum t. affirm the jury s vtrdii i t i 
i n Li'iis c a s *•*. 
F t - ' P L C 1 F i l l J V •• uh in i 1 I * "i i I i n ^ t i a j i ! A p r i l , x ^ o S . 
R . P A U L VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
,i.UMiT, i i H i t ur uia n 
) 
.ARFIELD) 
JAU 1 1333 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN W " » n n i r- w /•» r\ r» t r i n r> m i M x y l M c f T r r r A n n j 
The u n d e r s i g n e d , b e i n g f i r s t d i i I > swo r i i , d< 
that he has reason to b e l i e v e t h a t : 
( ) oi 1 t! ie p e r s o n ( s ) of 
on the p r e m i s e s k n o w n as
 2 6 0 n. 1Q0 w_ P a n ttjr4wh U T 8 4 ? 5 9 
residence of ^ Marilyn Mpsspr 
in the vehicle(s) described as vehicles at above resirien 
ce 
in the County of Ga< 
evi dence descri bed a 
I I 1 
narcoti^s 
a i t d 11 i a t s a i d p i o p e i t y o i e v i d e i i c e : 
( : ) is u n l a w f u l l y a c q u i r e d or un1 awf u1 1 y p o s s e s s e d 
( - ) has been used as a m e a n s of c o m m i t t i n g a publi c o f fens e 
( ) i s bein g p o ss es s ed w i t h t h e p u r p o s e to u se it a s a mea ns 
of c o m m i t t i n g or c o n c e a l i n g a p u b l i c o f f e n s e 
( , ) co n s i s t s of an it e m that c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of i 1 1 ega 1 
c o n d u c t , p o s s e s s e d by a pa rt y t o t he i 1 1ega 1 c o n du ct 
( ) c o n s i s t s of an item or c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of illegal 
c o n d u c t , p o s s e s s e d b > a p e r s o n or e n t i t y no t a [: a i t) t D 
the illegal c o n d u c t 
i s e v i c e r - i . ' 
w a r r a ! 
u p t i wjf %J 11 \J <_» I * J V _ » » \ _ L w c - » w « I I > \ _ V J a b o V e 
P o s s e s s i o n w i t h i n t e n t t o d i s t r i b u t e -
i l l e g a l s u b s t a n c 
. ' « • *
 f
 * a S e a r c h 
i n i u i i i i d i^xu c u i . t i d e n t i a l i n f o r i 
rant : s:- c 
i i d e n t i a l 
nformant 
-mant- bet v. ro and 
h i"i I i i i i n l f hpni f i \*r* » <rt 1 i a b 1 O . 
Affiant has verified the above information to be cu • r e - f in i 
rt r I 11 r a f e h P i" a u ( P ol t h r f n 1 1 11 M I in q m in d t p e n dent i i n v e s t i q a t l i J n 
Information from reliable informant informs 
that a supply of ill* «^  ml substances is onung in 
W H E R E F O R E , affiant prays th** 3 c~ 
fo r t he seizure of said items 
k IJ • 
" - r ssu^d 
i 1 in the daytime. 
{ l .ii any time day u i 11 i y h t b t a u . e I 11 H M< I \ M d M M L o believe 
i I is necessary to seize the property p rlo r t u if being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged in jllered, ni f r i 
good reason 
It is further requested ' h a * ',-f -;,^  ' .T > x r ~ .r z 
:
r
 • requested warrant not be required to give notice of affiant's 
a // ; r i t > * purpose because: [Such authority should be endorsed on War> 
( V ^ 
( ) 
: propert, 
secreted 
S 
A **i-
Mfi, ant 
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o be f or e me 11 i i s ? f t th day of A p r i l 
,u / 
W. YARDLLY 
'tice Court Judge o 
Garfield C.unty Justice C o u r t , 
Garfield C o u n t y , State of Utah 
rrsfrj^- j JAN I ' 1938 
CLERK 
GARF 
STATE OF UTAH 
i n i iN i Y ii ^ E A R L H W A R R A N T 
TO ANY PEACE O F F I C E R IN 71 IE STATE OF 1 J I A! I: 
P r o o f by a f f i d a v i t u n d e r o a t h I i a v i n g b t <_• 
b e ^ o r e m e by Robert V. Judd _ » I *• 
t here i s pi obab1e cause to believe t hat : 
( I on the per son ( s ) of 
saiiof ied that 
on the premises known as ^ 260 n. 1 00 w. Marilyn Messpr 
i r i the vehi clefs") described as located at above residpnrp 
:«scnfc-.: 
of Panguitch , Garfield Count y , Ut ah , there 
'3 possessed or concealed certain propert > o r e i de n c e 
coi ;t11"o 11 ed substance and> 'or i 11 ega 1 i iarcotics 
wh 
v possessed. 
«„•'-: * ^'j^r \f * -1 a pu b l i c o f f e n s e 
Dei ng p o s s e s s e d w *:( '? - • ,.-s- *' 
. * committing or concealing a public offense 
m i s t s of any items that constitutes e v i d e n t -
^onduct, possessed by a pa-t. :: '' 'fg,- ccrc.ct 
s evidence of illegal conduct in possession of 
or entity not a party to the illegal conduct and 
cause being shown that ihv •* . . ^- •-.:--•.-: re •. : 
by Subpo^^a vnthout the e ^ ^ ^ 
destroyed, damaged or altered. 
»e s n s 
!
 e r 
) I) 
he d a y t i m e 
ny time day 
t c e x e c / ? - * ' t h . •« : n e t -J * * ^  - " - * ^ * 
under o a t h b e i n g shown that the o b j e c ' * * •-
may be q u i c k l y d e s t r o y e d or d i s p o s e d of or that 
jerson notice w ^ e g i v e n ) 
n a k e 
y u c C II iiiOW f 1 } 
p u r p o s e (proof 
. a r, h 
• r t y 
o * • * • *-
 f a - . j ww . 
bring it forthwith before . i t a^ 
in Garfield County, Utah, or retain 
subject to the order of this Court. 
K a r t t h e r e t > t o 
C o u n t y J u s t i - P C c . r t 
r - o ^ + v — " - ,
 : (jy $ 
: ,r my h. 
_Apr iJL 
* s 28th day 
LLA^ (jJo 
W . Y A R D L E Y 
i s t i c e o f i n e P Pac e , 
G a r f i e 1 11 C o u n t v Ju s l i c e C o u r f 
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